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Introduction
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest trading program in the world designed to combat global climate change. The theory behind emissions trading is that a market mechanism is established in order to mitigate greenhouse gasses. After a cap is set and potential polluting firms have obtained allowances to emit, they can either (1) reduce their emissions and sell their allowances by, for example, investing in technological innovation; (2) use their allowances in order to cover their emissions; or, (3) increase their emissions by buying additional allowances on the market. However, the effectiveness of the system -scrutinized since its inception in 2005 by both economists and lawyers -thus far is disappointing 1 .
In practice, the success of the system will depend on control and compliance. Carrying out complete, coherent, transparent and accurate controlling and reporting on emission of greenhouse gases is considered fundamental for a proper functioning of the system 2 . The Commission already emphasised the importance of oversight and enforcement in its Green Paper on emission trading in the year 2000, by stating that: 'The purpose of strict compliance provisions and enforcement is to enhance confidence in the trading system, make it work in an efficient way in accordance with the rules of the internal market and at the same time increase the likelihood of achieving the desired environmental result 3 '. Compliance in this sense means monitoring the operation of covered installations to ensure that they operate in accordance with the requirements of the EU ETS in order to determine whether further inspection or enforcement is necessary to ensure compliance 4 . Whereas other parts of the EU ETS system have been centralized and harmonized over the last decade, this process did not encompass the entire compliance cycle: national competent authorities are still responsible for inspection and sanctioning 5 . A proper national monitoring and compliance mechanisms in each of the 31 participating States is important for the effectiveness and reliability of the EU ETS system as a whole. Therefore this article will focus on Poland, being one of the EU member States where the political acceptance of the EU ETS system appears to be extremely cumbersome due to a widespread conviction that the European energy and climate policy will lead to energy poverty and will affect the welfare of Polish families 6 . This article aims to assess to what extent Poland, in a political climate of strong resistance against the EU ETS system, has succeeded, first, to ensure the legal implementation of the EU ETS system in Polish law and policy and, second, to establish an effective and reliably EU ETS monitoring and enforcement system.
After a short account, in section 2, of the way Poland is dealing with its obligations emanating from the Kyoto Protocol, section 3 considers the legal implementation of the EU ETS in Polish law and policy. Section 4 describes and analyses the establishment in practice of an EU ETS monitoring system in Poland, and section 5 explores its enforcement system. Section 6 contains some concluding observations as to way Poland has put into operation its monitoring and enforcement obligations pertaining to the EU ETS system.
Since Poland became member of the EU as of 1 May 2004 and the EU ETS system did not begin to function in Poland until the summer of 2006, this study of the enforcement of EU ETS in Poland will focus on the end of the First Phase (2005) (2006) (2007) . The ETA system includes two sub-systems: 1) a community emission trading system, and 2) a national emission trading system 39 . The system covers GHGs 40 and other substances 41 . The community emission trading system covers GHGs. The national emission trading system covers the emission of 'other substances' into the air. A detailed list of the types of installations that have to be included in the system and their respective thresholds are set out in the regulation of the Minister of the Environment of 27 July 2009 on the types of installations covered by the Community emission allowance trading 45 and the principles of the operation of the National System for Emission Balancing and Forecasting. Further, it regulates the principles of the management of emissions of greenhouse gases and other substances; the principles of the operation of the National Registry of the Kyoto Units and emission allowance and the principles of trading in and managing the Kyoto units. It also provides the legal framework for the operation of the National Green Investment Scheme and the Climate Account, and of the management of the Joint 38 Article 40-52 ETA. 39 Article 5 item 1 ETA. 40 GHGs are described in Annex II to the ETS Directive as: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide(N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
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41 'Other substances' covered by the system are sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and dusts.
42 Available at http://www.kobize.pl/materialy/krajowe/rozp_MS_z_27_lipca_2009. pdf.
43 Supra note 28. 44 Id. 45 Article 3 EMA.
Implementation projects and Clean Development Mechanism projects in the territory of the Republic of Poland 46 . The list of greenhouse gases and other substances released into the air and covered by the system for the management of emissions of greenhouse gases and other substances is set out in the Annex to this Act 47 . 
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Preliminary Conclusion
As regards the contribution of ETS Act to the functioning of ETS in Poland, Jaś concluded the following: "ETS Act combines provisions of the Phase II with the provisions of the Phase III. As a matter of fact, the implementation of provisions of the Directive 2009/29 and other provisions of the Community law relating to the functioning of the ETS into the Polish legal system by the Act of 28 April 2011 is a work in progress 55 . The issues to be regulated include the terms of purchase of missing allowances at auctions, rules for allocation of free allowances (under articles 10(a) and 10(c) of the Directive 2009/29/EC), and the way of spending funds received from the sale of emission allowances. Much as these changes to the Act are absolutely necessary, it seems hardly possible that this will be done before the end of the second accounting period. It can be expected that it will rather be the period of the creative interpretation of the law and the close cooperation between the national administration and the government in terms of negotiating the scope of application and enforcement of the provisions of law" 56 . Stoczkiewicz is even more critical about the 2011 ETS Act. He points particularly at the lack of transposition of article 10(a), 10(c) and 3 (h) of Directive 2009/29/EC and the fact that "due to these deficiencies in transposition, Polish legislation does not exclude the possibility of free allowances for new entrants, i.e. installations that have obtained their first greenhouse gas emissions permit after 30 June 2011 57 ". In fact, the Polish Legislator forgot to transpose and implement the principles concerning auctioning and, instead, only took care of the exceptions to this principle 58 . Stoczkiewicz therefore concludes that "this partial and faulty transposition has a significant impact on the implementation of the amended 72 See also Article 6 EMA.
statistics. As regards the administration of the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme, KOBIZE in particular has the following tasks: a) keeping the electronic database containing information about installations subject to the scheme necessary for the development of the draft national greenhouse gas allocation plan (…); b) keeping the electronic database containing information about aircraft operators (…); c) providing opinions on monitoring plans, referred to in article 51 (1) of the Act of 28 April 2011 on the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme; d) collecting data and performing analyses on the scheme; e) developing of the draft national greenhouse gas allocation plan for the installations subject to the scheme; f ) compiling reports on the scheme in terms of participation in the system of installations and aircraft operators; g) providing explanations, preparing information and training materials; h) cooperation with public administration authorities and fulfilment of international commitments; i) keeping the list of the entities authorised to verify the reports specified in the Act of 28 April 2011 on the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme prepared by the aircraft operators and installation operators; j) conducting emission allowance; k) providing opinions on draft legal acts and documents concerning the scheme; l) drawing up lists of the installation operators and aircraft operators who infringed their obligations related to the participation in the scheme, and forwarding them to the Minister responsible for the environment. KOBIZE also keeps the list of the entities authorised to verify the reports. By 31 January of each year, the National Centre submits a report on the performance of its responsibilities to the Minister 75 . Where the report is incomplete or gives rise to objections, the Minister may request that the report should be supplemented or additional clarification should be provided 76 . If by the set date the National Centre fails to supplement the report or to submit the clarification required, or if the report submitted still gives rise to objections, the Minister may order to carry out an inspection in the scope of the tasks performed by the National Centre 77 . If any significant irregularities are found in the scope of the performance of its responsibilities by the National Centre, the Minister may dismiss the Director of the Institute of Environmental Protection 78 .
4.2.National Allocation Plans
National allocation plans (NAP) determined -during the trading period 2008-2012 79 -for each Member State the 'cap' or limit on the total amount of CO2 that installations covered by the EU ETS could emit, and set out how allowances would be allocated to individual installations. The National plans had to be consistent with the EU's and Member States' Kyoto commitments, with the actual verified emission levels reported in the Commission's annual progress reports and with the technological potential to reduce emissions. Article 13(1) of ETS Act determines what issues should be regulated in the national allocation plans.
The acceptance of the Polish NAPs by the European Commission was beset by long procedural disputes, including proceedings before the Court of First Instance of the European Community 80 . According to Karski: this 'bad experience with the community trading system negatively influenced the reception of this extremely interesting market-based instrument by generating general reluctance towards climate issues. The consequence has been a destabilization of the EU ETS and thus of this part of emission 75 
GHG Emissions Permit
Entities using installations covered by the system are obliged to obtain a permit for emissions of greenhouse gases 82 from the relevant authority at the level of sub-national government. In Poland, the body competent for issuing permits to take part in the trading scheme is the starost (county governor), or in the case of plants incorporating an installation which qualifies as an undertaking likely to have a significant impact on the environment -the competent marshal of the voivodship 83 . As mentioned, there are 16 voivodships and 314 (380) poviats in Poland. Permits are granted for a maximum period of 10 years 84 . The permit is one of the tools that helps supervise the system, but it is up to an independent decision of each regional administration institution if they conduct inspection during the process of issuing the permit 85 . The starost and the marshal of the voivodship are supervised by the Ministry of Environment and are not directly linked to, or accountable to, the monitoring and compliance system of the National Center (KOBIZE) and the Regional Inspectorates for Environmental Protection (Wojewódzki Inspektor Ochrony Środowiska). This structure makes the control on the issuance of GHG permits rather weak as became clear in e.g. the case of the Łęczna coal plant near the Ukrainian border 86 . In this case permits were issued for the coal plant worth of €33-million of free allowances. Under EU rules, exemptions from the ETS until 2020 -'10 c derogations' -can only be granted to power plants if their investment process was 'physically 81 L. Karski , a permit is an administrative decision allowing for emission of greenhouse gases from an installation covered by the system and defining duties of an entity using the installation as regards control 91 . The lack of such a permit means that using an installation in the area of emission of greenhouse gases covered by the system during the accounting period is not permitted. Where the entity using the installation does not possess a permit a penalty of 50.000 Euro can be imposed 92 . So far, this has never happened.
The Monitoring Plan
According to article 56 of ETS Act 93 , an entity using an installation covered by the system is obliged to draw up an emission monitoring plan. The monitoring plan goes through both ex-ante and ex-post control. Exante control is conducted by regional administration institutions [see under GHG Emissions Permits] EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community. This incorporation of aviation emissions in the EU ETS is one of the major developments in the EU ETS Phase III. Consequently, one of the new aspects in ETS Act is the regulation of the functioning of the scheme of aircraft operations performed by aircraft operators 98 .
4.5.Reporting
Every year, before 31 March, entities managing installations and aircraft operators have the obligation to submit 99 to the National Centre a verified report on the amount of GHG emission. The assessment by the National Centre includes an evaluation of completeness, correctness of calculation, compliance with MRR requirements and monitoring methodology approved in a monitoring plan 100 . The National Centre contacts the entity or operator for further explanations where it finds any irregularities. It can also require adjustments to be made in the report within 30 days 101 . If the deadline of 31 March is not met, the National Centre blocks the operator's or entity's account in the National Registry 102 .
In case of detection of noncompliance (lack of emission report, emission report submitted after the deadline, lack of surrendered allowances in registry, number of surrendered allowances is smaller than annual emission) 103 the National Centre draws up a list of these cases and forwards it to the Regional Inspectorates for Environmental Protection 104 by 15 May, and to the Minister of Environment. The latter publishes the list in the Public Information Bulletin (Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej) 105 . Noncompliance may finally lead to the imposition, by the Regional Inspectorates for Environmental Protection, of financial fines of up to 10.000 Euro -an amount considered to have a deterrent effect 106 . Where the National Centre has not been notified in due time of the fact that an installation has stopped to fulfil the requirement of the system, a penalty of 5000 Euro can be imposed 107 . So far, this has never occurred.
Verification
The institution responsible for accreditation of verifiers in Poland is the Polish Centre for Accreditation (a member of European Cooperation for Accreditation). The National Centre confirms that the non-compliance level is very low in Poland and adds that cases of non-compliance are usually related to meeting the deadline for the submission of annual emission reports. This is often due to the fact that there are not enough accredited verifiers on the market 115 . 
Ensuring Compliance
Inspection
As mentioned above, where the National Centre detects cases of noncompliance (lack of emission report, emission report submitted after the deadline, lack of surrendered allowances in registry, number of surrendered allowances is smaller than annual emission) 116 it draws up a list and forwards it to the relevant Regional Inspectorate for Environmental Protection for further factual control
117
. On the basis of this information the Regional Inspectorates for Environmental Protection plan and conduct their inspection activities. Inspection is considered 'a useful tool that could be used in more problematic cases (like lack of an emission report in case of cessation, bankruptcy, closures etc). However, due to high cost and capacity limitations it is up to an individual decision of each institution when and how to organize the inspection' 
Sanctions
The system for effective sanctions safeguarding the performance of the obligations imposed by the law is regulated in chapter 8 (Articles 51-67 122 on financial sanctions of ETS Act. In general possible sanctions are the following: blockade of an account in the registry (in case of lack of the report at the end of March); inspection and estimation of annual emission by a regional competent authority (in case of lack of the report or serious misstatements); financial fines (in case of lack of the permit, lack of the annual report or when insufficient number of allowances were surrendered); publication of company's name in official journal ("name and shame") 123 .
As mentioned above, the National Centre assesses the data and figures presented in the annual report and contacts the entity or operator for further explanations where it finds any irregularities. It can also require adjustments to be made in the report within 30 124 days
125
. The total number of permits that were updated during the reporting period because of a change in the nature or functioning, or extension, of installations made by operators as specified in article 7 of Directive 2003 /87/EC was in 2007 : 347, in 2008 : 317, in 2009 : 841, in 2010 : 286, in 2011 127 Article 62 item 1 and 3 ETS Act; Article 87 item 1-2 ETS Act 2015. 128 In 2012 KOBIZE blocked 3 accounts in the registry as a sanction for incompliance. Some other accounts were temporary blocked for missing the deadline for submission of the annual emission report or when some mistakes were found in the emission report during the assessment in KOBIZE. Those accounts were later unblocked when the annual emission reports were submitted or when the corrected versions of the annual emission reports were provided. 
Concluding Observations
The process of centralization and harmonization of the European Union Emission Trade System does not encompass the entire compliance cycle: national competent authorities remain responsible for inspection and sanctioning, and are in charge of ensuring compliance of the measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) process. . Whereas this delayed transposition of this Directive slows down the realization of the Third Phase of the EU ETS in Poland, it does not directly affect the functioning of the Polish EU ETS monitoring and compliance system and institutions as such.
With regard to the realization of an effective and reliable EU ETS monitoring and compliance system in Poland, it can be concluded that the control over permit issuance is a weak point in the system. One of the reasons might be the deficient connection between the ex-ante monitoring and compliance conducted by regional administrative authorities who issue permits for GHG emission and the ex-post monitoring and compliance by the National Centre and the Regional Inspectorates for Environmental Protection.
Further, the fact that between 2007 and 2012 no fines were imposed at all 143 is remarkable, but can probably be attributed to the deterrent effect of the high fines for the different infringements; to the fact that operators and entities have ample opportunity to update their permits, and to the fact that the National Centre sends reminders before each important deadline and regularly blocks the account of an operator or entity in the National Registry. However, the lack of accredited verifiers on the market has already resulted in some practical problems and might become a point of concern for the functioning of the monitoring and compliance system in the Third Phase (until 2020) and afterwards. In general it can be concluded that, so , the strong political resistance against the EU ETS system as a whole has not been able to significantly influence the legal implementation of the EU ETS system in Polish law and policy neither has it prevented the practical realization of an EU ETS monitoring and enforcement system. The true litmus test though for functioning of the Polish EU ETS monitoring and compliance system and its institutions will come after 2030, when the privileged position of the Polish energy companies will come to an end 145 .
